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IP High Court Clarifies Limits of “Motivation to Combine” in Patent Opposition Appeal
Masashi Chusho
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*Please note that this newsletter is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. In addition, it is based on information as of its date of publication and does not reflect information after such date. In particular, please also note that preliminary reports in this newsletter may differ from current interpretations and practice depending on the nature of the report.
When a company goes into insolvent liquidation, maximising recovery for the company’s legitimate creditors takes highest priority.
In order to better protect the interests of creditors, Singapore law has long recognised that a company in liquidation should be protected from frivolous lawsuits, in order to ensure that the liquidation process is carried out smoothly and efficiently without incurring additional costs depleting the company’s asset pool. This protection comes in two ways:
Sometimes, in the course of administering the winding-up of a company, it may become necessary for the liquidators of the company to enter into separate contracts with third parties. The question then arises as to whether proceedings arising out of such separate contracts are also subject to the Court’s protection.
This was squarely addressed by the Singapore High Court in the recent case of Kardachi, Jason Alexander and another v Deepak Mishra and others [2025] SGHC 218 (“Kardachi”), which answered the question in the affirmative. While the case in Kardachi concerned bankruptcy proceedings for an individual (which are administered by people known as “private trustees”), the conclusions drawn by the Court could be equally applicable to the insolvent liquidation of companies.
Mr. Rajesh Bothra, a businessman, was adjudged bankrupt in Singapore on 21 February 2021, but fled the country to avoid the consequences of bankruptcy in Singapore. The private trustees of Mr. Bothra’s estate in bankruptcy reached out to a former business associate of Mr. Bothra, Mr. Deepak Mishra, for his help in investigating the pre-bankruptcy affairs and dealings of Mr. Bothra. As part of this investigation, the private trustees and Mr. Mishra signed a waiver agreement, which contained an arbitration clause.
Subsequently, the private trustees commenced court proceedings to reverse a number of transactions Mr. Bothra had carried out to Mr. Mishra, his wife, and their alleged companies. The grounds for unwinding these transactions were that, among others, they were at an undervalue, were unauthorised, or constituted an unfair preference.
Mr. Mishra subsequently commenced an arbitration against the private trustees under the waiver agreement, though he did not seek the prior leave of Court to do so. He alleged that by commencing the court proceedings, the private trustees had breached the waiver agreement in the following ways: (1) breach of an implied duty to act in good faith, by using the documents Mr. Mishra had provided to commence legal proceedings against him; and (2) breach of an implied agreement that the documents provided by Mr. Mishra could only be used for the private trustees’ investigation into the affairs and dealings of Mr. Bothra.
The private trustees then applied to Court for a declaration that Mr. Mishra had not sought leave of Court to commence the arbitration proceedings, and to restrain Mr. Mishra from taking further steps in the arbitration.
The Court found in favour of the private trustees, holding that the Court’s permission must be sought before commencing proceedings, including arbitration proceedings, against private trustees in bankruptcy. The fact that Mr. Mishra’s claim had arisen out of a separate, post-bankruptcy agreement signed with the private trustees did not constitute an exception to this rule.
In so finding, the Court highlighted that the rationale behind requiring the Court’s permission is to “avoid unnecessary and expensive legal proceedings arising from frivolous claims so as to avoid additional expense to the general body of creditors”. The policy interest in protecting the insolvent party’s estate remained relevant where the private trustees had entered into a private agreement with a third party.
Further, Mr. Mishra had sought to rely on Section 420(2) of the IRDA (which states that arbitration agreements entered into by the bankrupt party before their bankruptcy, which are adopted by the private trustee administering the bankruptcy, shall be “enforceable”) to argue that arbitration proceedings are an exception to the rule that the Court’s permission is required. However, the Court also disagreed with this argument. Whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, and whether the Court’s permission is required, are two separate matters.
Mr. Mishra had also applied to retrospectively seek the Court’s permission to commence the arbitration proceedings. Retrospectively requesting the Court’s leave is generally allowed, as this better serves the objective of sieving out claims which are frivolous, or which may delay the liquidation process.
However, the Court declined to retrospectively permit Mr. Mishra to commence the arbitration against the private trustees in Kardachi because the requirement of a “prima facie arguable case” was not satisfied in this case. This was because the waiver agreement between Mr. Mishra and the private trustees contained an entire agreement clause, which provided very clearly that no other terms shall be implied into the agreement. As such, Mr. Mishra failed to prove his case on the implication of terms into the agreement.
Given the prevalence of arbitration agreements in business contracts, it would be important for parties to keep in mind the strong public policy interest upheld by the Singapore Courts in bankruptcy situations, and to ensure the relevant pre-requisites are met before commencing arbitration.
This newsletter is given as general information for reference purposes only and therefore does not constitute our firm’s legal advice. Any opinion stated in this newsletter is a personal view of the author(s) and not our firm’s official view. Given the nature of this newsletter as general information, statutory provisions and source citations may have been intentionally omitted. For any specific matter or legal issue, please do not rely on this newsletter but make sure to consult a legal adviser. We would be delighted to answer your questions, if any.
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